Pages

Corporate Governance & Enforcement

The corporate governance norms prescribed by SEBI were tightened earlier this month (as discussed here), whereby the requirement of independence of directors has been made more stringent. However, it is disheartening to note that while there is a move by the regulator to enhance mandatory norms on corporate governance at a substantive level, there is a lot still left to be desired when it comes to implementation. We often find that the principal defaulters are the public sector undertakings themselves. See this news report in Telecom Tiger (http://www.telecomtiger.com/fullstory.aspx?storyid=1681):

“The Controller and Auditor General (CAG) of India has hit out strongly against state-run MTNL stating that the PSU is flouting corporate governance norms by not appointing specified number of independent Directors on its board as per Clause 49 of the listing agreement.

According to the CAG report, there is only one independent director on the board of MTNL, which operates telecom services in Delhi and Mumbai, as against the requirement of six independent directors.”
Such stories have been repeated in the Indian corporate sector over the last few years. Although the enforcement of corporate governance norms is crucial to the success of a good governance regime, at present it appears that companies, especially the public sector undertakings, are largely able to escape with impunity in spite of failure to comply with the corporate governance norms. Stricter implementation of corporate governance norms should not only ensure proper appointment of truly independent directors on corporate boards, but also that they discharge their functions effectively and carry out their responsibilities to protect the interests of the public shareholders in a listed company.

While on this topic, it is worth briefly noting some recent developments in Singapore. The Code of Corporate Governance 2005 in Singapore also requires the appointment of independent directors constituting at least one-third of the board. Companies did comply with these requirements of appointment. However, over a period of time, whenever there was a corporate governance failure in a company, it was found that the independent directors simply resigned from their posts, often citing person reasons or other reasons not related to the governance of the company. Hence, regulators have now required companies to explain the reasons for resignation of independent directors, so that shareholders are made aware of the precise background of events that led to independent director resignations.

Most recently, an independent director of China Aviation Oil, Lee Suet Fern, resigned from the board of the company. In her letter of resignation, she said it was becoming increasingly difficult for her to properly discharge her role, as a result of CAO's approach to information flow and the management of decision making, review and oversight. This compelled the company to strengthen its measures to improve corporate governance and also to announce the same to its shareholders. This episode indicates that while resignation by independent directors is not the ideal response to corporate governance problems within companies, they do bring out these concerns into the open and force such companies to act in more transparent manner.

REMFs: The New Indian Real Estate Investment Opportunity

It was back in 2006 that SEBI had cleared the deck for the launch of real estate mutual funds (REMFs) as means to enable retail investors to take advantage of the enhancement in Indian property prices. For almost two years, there were no concrete steps taken to promulgate regulations for the establishment of REMFs. However, on April 25, 2008, SEBI announced amendments to the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 that permit the launch of REMFs. The notification amending the Regulations is available here.

The REMF scheme is one which invests directly or indirectly in real estate assets or other permissible assets. Some of the key features of REMFs as allowed by SEBI are as follows:

- Existing mutual funds are eligible to launch REMFs if they have adequate number of experienced key personnel / directors.

- Sponsors seeking to set up new mutual funds, for launching only REMF schemes, shall be carrying on business in real estate for a period not less than five years. They shall also fulfill all other eligibility criteria applicable for sponsoring a mutual fund.
- Every REMF scheme shall be close-ended and its units shall be listed on a recognized stock exchange.

- Net asset value (NAV) of the scheme shall be declared daily.

- At least 35% of the net assets of the scheme shall be invested directly in real estate assets. The balance may be invested in mortgage backed securities, securities of companies engaged in dealing in real estate assets or in undertaking real estate development projects and other securities. Taken together, investments in real estate assets, real estate related securities (including mortgage backed securities) shall not be less than 75% of the net assets of the scheme.

- Each asset shall be valued by two valuers, who are accredited by a credit rating agency, every 90 days from date of purchase. The lower of the two values shall be taken for the computation of NAV

- Caps have been imposed on investments in a single city, single project, securities issued by sponsor/associate companies etc.

- The amended regulations have also specified accounting and valuation norms pertaining to REMF schemes.
The delay in the launch of REMFs is perhaps understandable. There are several complexities involved in the operation of real estate funds that require careful consideration. I had written an op-ed column in businesslawyer.in a few months ago highlighting these complexities:

“The delay in establishment of a legal regime for real estate mutual funds can be ascribed to complexities associated with the Indian real estate sector. To mention a few, the real estate sector is bogged down by problems with title to land owing to the absence of proper maintenance of title records. India does not offer title certification and properties are often the subject-matter of litigation for protracted periods of time. The real estate sector is also burdened with a high incidence of stamp duties – achieving uniformity and reduction in stamp duties is an almost impossible task as stamp duty on conveyance of immovable property is a matter for states to legislate, and not the Centre. Apart from legal problems, there are also commercial issues to grapple with – to name just one, valuation of real estate is highly contentious. Due to the existence of these fundamental issues relating to the real estate sector, investments in this sector tend to be risky.

Regulation of REMFs need to take into account these risks specific to the real estate sector so that while REMFs provide an attractive investment avenue to retail investors, regulation also protects their interests against industry-specific risks. This can be achieved through stringent disclosure norms that are prescribed by the regulators.”
The amended regulations issued by SEBI on REMFs do address some of these concerns, while they are lacking on others. First, on the question of specific disclosure norms governing REMFs, the regulations do not specify the disclosures to be made by REMFs while launching a scheme, and it is left to SEBI to prescribe those. While it may have been prudent for the disclosure norms to have been set out in the regulations themselves, there is still opportunity for SEBI to prescribe the disclosure norms. It would be imperative for SEBI to announce a detailed set of disclosures for REMFs that take into account the risks involved in real estate investments. This ought to be effected promptly, and in any case before REMF schemes are in fact launched by mutual funds. A uniform set of disclosures would also enable investors to compare various REMF investment options.

Second, on the question of valuation, SEBI’s efforts are laudable as it appears to have placed significant emphasis on this aspect, as the amended regulations contain a great level of detail not only in respect of the norms of valuation, but also on the manner in which the valuation process itself is carried out. For example, there are requirements for valuation by two valuers who do not possess any conflict of interest. Further, there is a cooling off period whereby no valuer can continue with valuation of a particular real estate for more than two years and that no such valuer can value that same asset for a period of three years thereafter.

In all, with the returns from the real estate sector looking quite promising, this step of allowing REMFs provides an additional opportunity to retail investors to benefit from property value appreciation, and the Indian markets will certainly witness the launch of several REMF schemes in the near future, now that SEBI has paved the way for them.

What is still unclear though is whether REMFs would be the only avenue available to retail investors, or whether real estate investment trusts (REITs) would also be an option. As we had discussed in an earlier post on this blog, SEBI had announced draft regulations for REITs in December last year. While some of the features of REMFs are similar to those of REITs, their treatment in the respective regulations by SEBI is not quite the same. There have been no further steps taken on the REITs front, and it remains to be seen whether the REMFs presently announced eclipse developments on the REITs front or whether we could possibly witness the emergence of REITs in addition to REMFs.
(Update – May 7, 2008: Here is a column in The Economic Times analysing the new regulations on real estate mutual funds)

Success of Venture Capital Investments in India

One of our readers, Aravind Balajee, brings to our attention this story from VC Circle. It relates to a tremendously successful exit by a venture capital investor, UTI Ventures, from an Indian portfolio company, Excelsoft Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The details are here:
“There is a thing or two to learn from this exit deal of UTI Ventures. One is that the Indian software product companies are not all that bad an investment. Second, early stage investment in India can get you bumper returns (of course, if your investment is right).

The Bangalore-based venture-turned-growth capital private equity firm has made the highest multiple of returns for an Indian fund from Excelsoft Technologies Pvt Ltd, the Mysore-based e-learning company. Global private equity fund DE Shaw has bought out the entire 35.5 per cent stake of UTI Ventures in Excelsoft for $31 million. UTIVF’s original investment in the company was only Rs 2.5 crore (in 2000) or $600,000.

The previous higher exit multiples include about 26-30X in Suzlon Energy by ChrysCapital and Citigroup Venture Capital, 25X in Mphasis by Baring Private Equity and Gaja Capital Partner’s 22X in another e-learning company Educomp Solutions.”

For any venture capital (VC) or private equity (PE) investor, the availability of a smooth exit from the investment is one of the most critical factors that determine the investment’s success. Exit can be achieved through a sale of securities by the VC or PE investor into the stock markets in case of listed securities. Such investors also exit through initial public offerings (IPOs) by the portfolio companies, whereby the securities get listed on one or more stock exchanges. The obligation of the portfolio company to provide a stock market exit (usually by way of an IPO) to the VC or PE investor is detailed in specific terms in the investment agreements entered into between the VC or PE investors on the one hand and the portfolio company or its promoters on the other. Exit can be achieved by way of a private sale to another investor (in case of both listed and unlisted securities).

The liquidity, depth and robustness of the stock markets are important factors that determine the success of a market sale, whereas the availability of a strong community of financial investors (that buy stakes from other investors) determines the success of a private sale.

Examples like the UTI-Excelsoft deal demonstrate that the Indian markets are maturing at a rapid pace to provide better exits to VC and PE investors. This is despite the markets having suffered temporary setbacks owing to financial crises that have been gripping world markets over the last year or so. The trading activity on the two primary Indian stock exchanges (Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange) has grown exponentially. Further, the markets have also grown in terms of the number of listed companies. As a paper “Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India” (that we had reviewed in an earlier post on this blog) notes:

“… India has an extraordinarily high number of listed companies—second only to the US. However, their average market capitalization is relatively small. Moreover, the ‘depth’ of India’s equity markets—as measured by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP—is higher than that for comparable developing countries such as China, or indeed for many developed countries, including Germany”
This fact indicates that the increasing maturity and liquidity of the Indian markets facilitates easier exit by VC and PE investors through stock market sales.

Similarly, there has also been a rise in the VC and PE investment community in India thereby expanding the market for private sales. With more and more players entering the space, there are increasing numbers of investors that are willing to acquire stakes from VC or PE investors in Indian companies on a private basis through negotiations. This provides an avenue for VC and PE investors to sell in a private market even if the securities of the portfolio company have not been listed in an IPO. The UTI exit from Excelsoft presents a typical illustration of a private sale, where the shares were sold in this instance to DE Shaw, a private equity player.

Apart from ease of exits (and myriad other commercial and business factors), the availability of a facilitative and unambiguous legal regime governing VC and PE investors is also determinative of the success of the industry. As far as the VC industry is concerned, the venture capital norms issued by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), separately for the domestic industry (in the form of the SEBI (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations, 1996) and for the offshore industry (in the form of the SEBI (Foreign Venture Capital Investor) Regulations, 2000) have evolved over a period of time creating an increasingly favourable regime for VC investors.

The PE industry, on the other hand, is not directly regulated by any Indian regulatory authority, but is subject to the same regulations for investment that govern other foreign direct investors (FDI) or foreign institutional investors (FIIs). The continuing liberalisation of FDI and FII norms has indirectly benefited the PE industry in bringing about flexibility in their investment norms. Of course, there are, and would continue to be, several operational issues that still require to be addressed, but at an overall level, the legal regime relating to VCs and PEs have come a long way.

Even when it comes to contracting with VC and PE investors, Indian companies and their advisors are increasingly becoming familiar with Silicon-valley style investment agreements for VC investors and international standards on terms and conditions in PE agreements. Such familiarity with international best practices on the part of the Indian industry would aid in the development of a vibrant VC and PE markets in India. In all, the legal and contractual regimes for VC and PE investments facilitate a vibrant market and an increasingly large number of successful deals bear testimony to this fact.

Role of Law and Politics in India’s Economic Growth

There is a recent paper titled “Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India” by John Armour and Priya Lele that has been posted on SSRN. The authors join the debate as to whether a country’s legal origins (e.g. common law or civil law) necessarily have an impact on the extent of its financial development, and in doing so, they examine India as a case study. The authors find that in India’s case, political explanations have a greater bearing in explaining India’s growth, and that its legal heritage as a common law country has not played a significant role towards that end.

Here is the abstract:

“The process of liberalization of India's economy since 1991 has brought with it considerable development both of its financial markets and the legal institutions which support these. An influential body of recent economic work asserts that a country's 'legal origin' - as a civilian or common law jurisdiction - plays an important part in determining the development of its investor protection regulations, and consequently its financial development. An alternative theory claims that the determinants of investor protection are political, rather than legal. We use the case of India to test these theories. We find little support for the idea that India's legal heritage as a common law country has been influential in speeding the path of regulatory reforms and financial development. There is a complementarity between (i) India's relative success in services and software, (ii) the relative strength of its financial markets for outside equity, as opposed to outside debt, and (iii) the relative success of stock market regulation, as opposed to reforms of creditor rights. We conclude that political explanations have more traction in explaining the case of India than do theories based on 'legal origins'.”
The paper also contains a useful background discussion about the development of various institutions in India’s business and financial sectors. These include the evolution and the roles of bodies like the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Reserve Bank of India (BSE) as well as other self-regulatory bodies like the stock exchanges. The paper also offers some reasons why the capital markets in India have been growing at a fast pace and acquiring greater depth, while the debt markets (including for bank lending) have not been keeping the same pace.